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ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court erred in failing to objectively entertain Appellants' Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment, Part 1 of 4: Public Roadway on its merits. 
Appellees present four general arguments in support of its position that the trial 
did not err when it failed address the Appellants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Part 1 of 4: Public Roadway on its merits. However, as discussed below, Appellees' four 
arguments must fail. 
A. Appellants may appeal the trial court's denial of Summary Judgment. 
Appellees first argue that "no appeal lies from a denial of a Motion for Summary 
Judgment" and conclude thereby that it is not proper for this Court to review the trial 
court's denial of Summary Judgment. [Brief of Appellees, p. 17]. However, this is not 
the controlling Utah law1. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently held that "A trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a motion for summary judgment is a legal one and will be reviewed for 
correctness." Armed Forces Ins. Exck v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14 % 13, 70 P.3d 35, 39 
(citing Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 
Appellees find support for this position in two Utah Supreme Court opinions dated 1977 and 1961, and one Idaho 
Supreme Court opinion dated 2003. The two Utah Supreme Court opinions are concerned with the ripeness of a 
review from summary judgment, and both involved only the denial of a motion for summary judgment before the 
trial was complete. Clearly in these instances, an appellate court would be wise to wait until a final judgment is 
rendered in the case before expending scare judicial resources adjudicating a case that the trial court has not had the 
chance to finish reviewing. The proper and complete rule of law from these cases should therefore read as follows: 
Where a trial court has only denied a motion for summary judgment and the case is still pending before the trial 
court, the order denying a motion for summary judgment is not a final order that can be directly appealed until a 
final order is given. Also, Idaho Supreme Court cases are not controlling in Utah, especially where the Utah 
Supreme Court has taken such a definitive stance in opposition to the Idaho position. Therefore, the Idaho opinion 
will not be reviewed in this response. 
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1995)(internal citations deleted)); See also, Otsuka Elecs. (USA) v. Imaging Specialists, 
937 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)("In examining the court's denial of summary 
judgment, we review for correctness the trial court's conclusion that appellants were not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). Here, Appellants seek review of the trial 
court's decision to deny a motion for Summary Judgment. [See Appellants Brief, p. 16]. 
Plainly, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the denial of Summary Judgment is both 
ripe for review and justiciable. Therefore, this Court should follow established Utah 
precedent and review the propriety of the trial court's denial of summary judgment. 
Curiously, one of the cases that Appellees cite in support of the standard that they 
set forth involves the Utah Supreme Court entertaining a litigant's appeal of a denial of 
summary judgment. Christensen v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 443 P.3d ^ 85 (Utah 
1968). In that case, the Supreme Court concluded that, "[w]hile ordinarily the denial of a 
motion for summary judgment is not appealable because it is not a final judgment, 
nevertheless when there are no issues of fact to be determined and the only dispute 
involves a question of law, we think this court has the duty and the power when a matter 
is before us to direct the lower court to enter a judgment according to the law of the 
case." Id. at 200. The appeal before this Court concerns specific questions of law, as 
Appellees have pointed out in their brief, [see Appellees' Brief, p. 17]. Clearly then, 
because this is an appeal questioning a matter of law, the appeal is justiciable. 
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B. The facts are not relevant. 
Appellees next argue that because the facts related to the denial of Summary 
Judgment are not directly appealed, it is pointless to revisit the denial of Summary 
Judgment. Because this Court's standard of review is de novo, however, the Appellees' 
argument is baseless. 
The trial court's finding of facts is limited to the phrase, "no admissible evidence 
supports [the motion for Summary Judgment]." [Order on Motions, R. 1491 at \ 3]. 
However, even if the trial court had made plethora of findings, the Appellants do not 
have to specifically challenge those findings for an appeal to be justiciable. As noted in 
Section I. A. above, this appeal involves issues of law. The facts in an appeal of a 
Summary Judgment ruling are considered de novo by the Appellant Court anyway, 
regardless of whether they are specifically appealed. Bowler v. Deseret Village Ass 'n, 
922 P.2d 8,11 (Utah 1996). Because this appeal involves issues of law, the Court should 
consider the facts of the case de novo without the Appellants having to specify that they 
are also appealing the facts. Therefore, Appellees' second argument is entirely without 
merit. 
C. Public roadway defense was properly pled. 
Appellees next argue that, because Appellants allegedly did not properly plead a 
public-roadway defense, the trial court was correct to deny summary judgment. 
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However, as Appellants apply demonstrated in their brief, the public-road defense was 
sufficiently pled and should have been considered. 
To briefly surmise Appellant's position, the issue of Hope Lane as a public 
roadway was pled sufficiently by the Tamangs in the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
[Appellants' Brief, p. 17]. Further, the Tamangs' Answer filed September 8,2000 
claimed as their "Seventh Defense" that Hope Lane is a public road. [Answer, p. 10]. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 8(c) states, "[w]hen a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a 
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, 
shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation." Clearly then, the trial 
court should have viewed Tamangs' "Seventh Defense" as a counterclaim if justice so 
required. 
Here, it is apposite to view the defense as a counterclaim because justice is not 
aggrieved. The Utah Supreme Court has held that where a party has been given adequate 
notice of the issue raised and an opportunity to respond, Rule 8(c) is satisfied. Cheney v. 
Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963). Appellees in this case had over a year between the 
time they received Tamangs' Answer and when they filed for Summary Judgment to 
consider whether Hope Lane is a public roadway and respond to it. Further, Appellees 
had almost two years before the July 2,2002 hearing to consider whether Hope Lane is a 
public roadway and respond to it. Plainly, Appellees had notice and were capable of 
anticipating the issue of whether Hope Lane is a public roadway. Because Appellees had 
Page 4 of 25 
notice, justice is not aggrieved. As a result, it is appropriate to view the Tamangs5 
"Seventh Defense" as a counterclaim. 
Appellees note that, generally, a court cannot adjudicate and enter judgment on an 
unpled claim. [Apellees' Brief, p. 18]. Appellees contend that, based on this rule, the 
trial court could not have adjudicated the motion for Summary Judgment because the 
public roadway issue was not pled. Second, Appellees argue that because the Tamangs 
did not file an independent public roadway motion, it was not properly pled. Finally, 
Appellees note that because the Tamangs only joined the prior motions, which included 
the Public Roadway Motion, without filing an independent motion, this should somehow 
lessen the impact of joinder. Thus, Appellees conclude that the public roadway was 
unpled. 
Appellees, however, greatly exaggerate the complexity of this issue in their brief. 
The simple truth is that the Tamangs mistakenly listed a counterclaim as a defense, and 
then, after the other Appellants properly filed a Motion on the Public Roadway issue, 
joined the other Appellants. Because the Tamangs properly joined a pending motion, and 
because the Tamangs had previously filed this motion, the trial Court was wrong to not 
rule on it. 
D. Justice requires treating the defense as a counterclaim. 
Appellees finally argue that the denial of summary judgment was correct because 
the trial court properly exercised its discretion to not treat the Tamangs' affirmative 
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defense as a counterclaim. As explained above, however, the trial court was incorrect in 
ignoring this Motion because the motion was properly plead. 
First, Appellees claim that a case used in support of Appellants' position "does not 
even address the subject." [Appellees' Brief, p. 20]. This is untrue. In Cheney, 381 P.2d 
at 91, the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether the trial court should have considered a 
defense where the party had not affirmatively pled that defense. The Supreme Court held 
that, according to Utah R. Civ. Pro. 8(c), where the defendant has given adequate notice 
of the issues raised, and the opposing side has been given the opportunity to meet those 
issues, Rule 8(c) is satisfied and the defense should be allowed. Id. The Court also noted 
that the opposing party should be given "reasonable time to meet the new issue if he so 
requests." Id. The Court also considered Utah R. Civ. Pro. 54(c)(1) and held that this 
rule confirms the idea of notice because it states that "[E]very final judgment shall grant 
the relief to which the party is whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has 
not demanded such relief. Id. Clearly, Cheney, in part, stands for the proposition that 
where the opposing party has notice and opportunity to meet the issue, justice requires 
the Court to permit the issue to be reviewed in accordance with Utah R. Civ. Pro. 8(c). 
Id. Thus, the Trial Court should have considered the public roadway motion. 
Appellees next argue that the standard is "abuse of discretion" and not "clearly 
erroneous." [Appellees' Brief, pp. 18-19]. In support of Appellees' argument, Appellees 
point to federal cases holding that the proper standard for review of Rule 8(c) is "abuse of 
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discretion." [Id. at 19.] However, this issue has not been adjudicated in Utah. Other 
Utah cases that review a trial court's interpretation of other Rules of Civil Procedure are 
consistently measured against the "clearly erroneous" standard. See e.g., 438Main Street 
v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72 \ 72; Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 
1998); and Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148,1151 (Utah 1989). This is because in Utah, a 
court's finding of fact will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous, and many of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, including whether justice requires a defense to be treated as a 
counterclaim from Rule 8(c), are based on the court's finding of fact. Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). 
For instance, in Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, the Utah Supreme Court struggled with 
what standard of review was correct when reviewing a grant of an easement. Id. The 
Supreme Court reasoned that, although granting an easement is a question of law, it is so 
tied up in the facts of the case that the "clearly erroneous" standard is correct. Id. at 312. 
Just as the decision to grant an easement is tied up in, and ultimately dependent upon, the 
facts, deciding whether "justice so requires" in an action involving Utah R. Civ. Pro. 8(c) 
is also intrinsically tied up in the facts. Thus, in Utah, the "clearly erroneous" standard is 
the correct standard to use when deciding whether justice so required the trial court to 
view the defense as a counterclaim. Consequently, this is the standard the Court should 
adopt in this case. 
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A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against the clear weight of evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made. Jones, Waldo, Holbrock & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah 
1996). The facts of this case are strongly convincing that the trial court was in error. 
The trial Court based its decision to not allow the defense to be pled as a 
counterclaim because it felt that the issue was not timely raised. However, the trial court 
had been liberal in allowing both sides to file pleadings and motions well past the 
established deadline. The trial court noted that "the parties tactily agreed to ignore [the] 
cut off date," and "I will [ignore the cut off date] too." But the trial Court did not ignore 
the cut off date—instead, it retroactively applied an arbitrary cut off date to Appellants5 
detriment after it permitted Appellees to enter a Motion for Summary Judgment past the 
deadline. It is clear error to allow one party to file a motion after an established deadline, 
but then to refuse the opposing party the same opportunity. This error is greatly 
exacerbated whea the timeline is imposed retroactively upon the parties. The Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure exist to ensure fairness, Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 312 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992), and permitting one party to do the exact thing that is denied the other party is 
contrary to the very essence of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Even if Appellees are correct and the proper standard is abuse of discretion, the 
trial court abused its discretion in this case. A court abuses its discretion where it 
exceeds the limits of reasonability. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1 ^ 101. Here, it is not 
Page 8 of 25 
reasonable for the trial court to enact a retroactive schedule and artificially impose a 
deadline upon one of the parties but not the other. Both parties filed late motions, but 
only one party's late filing was accepted. Clearly, it was not a reasonable means of 
conducting the business of the court, and any objective and reasonable observer would 
agree. 
Finally, Appellees argue that the public roadway issue was not properly pled, and 
therefore the trial court was justified in denying the claim. As mentioned above, 
however, the public roadway issue was wrongly listed as a defense, not as a 
counterclaim. The trial court clearly had the ability to view the defense as a counterclaim 
or a counterclaim as a defense as justice so required. Appellees argue that justice did not 
require the Public Roadway issue to be addressed because the trial court felt that 
Appellants presented a "moving target" throughout the proceedings. 
However, it is easy for the trial court, apparently in hindsight, to analyze the 
Appellants' actions and categorize the Appellants as "moving targets" when the trial 
court artificially and retroactively imposed the standard by which Appellants were 
adjudicated. The fact remains that Appellants relied on the trial court's willingness to 
overlook deadlines. 
Appellants, acting in reliance on the trial court's precedent, were only doing what 
they thought, and what the trial court ratified through previous holdings, was appropriate 
in this case. Therefore, because Appellants were attempting to act within the constraints 
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of the Court, justice would not be impaired if the Court had treated the defense as a 
counterclaim pursuant to Utah R. Civ. Pro. 8(c). 
2. The trial court abused its discretion by generally disregarding the cut off date 
and allowing motions to be filed untimely; and, in the same breath, 
disallowing amendments to the motions because the amendments were 
untimely. 
Point Two of the Appellees' Brief is a justification of the trial court's disparate 
treatment of the two parties in this case. In essence, Appellees first argue that the trial 
court entertained both Appellees' and Appellants' Motions filed after the original cut off 
date so therefore the parties were not treated differently. Next, Appellees argue that the 
trial court's decision to deny Appellants' Motion to Amend did not unfairly prejudice the 
Appellants. Appellees adamantly profess that these two issues should be reviewed totally 
independent of each other. These justifications, however, fail to support the trial court's 
decision. 
The trial court did not treat the two parties equitably by allowing the parties to file 
late motions but then denying the Appellants the right to amend their motion. All parties 
involved in this action and the trial court itself, disregarded the motion deadline. The 
trial court accepted two motions past the deadline, one from each party. But when 
Appellants, acting pro se, wanted to amend their Motion, suddenly the trial court 
announced that the deadline was too rigid to allow such amendments. If the trial court 
and both parties have agreed to disregard the deadlines, the trial court is not justified in 
enacting new deadlines without adequate notice. Here the parties, and particularly the 
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party acting pro se, were relying on a consistent application of the rules. Clearly, the trial 
court's deviation from the status quo upon which the parties justifiably rely is an abuse of 
the trial court's discretionary powers. 
The Appellees would have this Court ignore the big picture by taking a myopic 
viewpoint of the issues. Specifically, Appellees argue that the denial to allow Appellants 
the right to amend must be viewed separately from the acceptance of late motions. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the trial court admittedly disregarded deadlines in 
general by allowing late motions to be filed must have an effect on the Appellants' 
reliance to amend the Motion. Appellants' reliance upon the trial court is briefly 
summarized above and is laid out in detail in Appellants' Brief. [See Appellants' Brief, 
pp. 21-25]. Appellees contention that Appellants are "confusing [the] issues" is 
categorically incorrect, and Appellees' argument that the trial court correctly addressed 
the parties' motions for summary judgment and correctly denied the leave to amend must 
likewise fail. 
3. The trial court erred in allowing Appellees' handwrting expert and other 
non-expert witnesses to present testimony and other evidence of forgery of 
the Easement Document and Quit Claim Deed when a notary public was a 
"subscribing witness" to the signing of those documents. 
The trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Appellees' handwriting expert, 
John Ashton, David Carter, and Stuart Wentz, that the grantors' signatures were not 
genuine. Appellees articulate six arguments to justify upholding the trial court's decision 
allowing the handwriting testimony. First, Appellees argue that the handwriting 
Page 11 of 25 
testimony was never objected to at trial. Second, Appellees argue that that the Appellants 
have failed to marshal the evidence regarding the admission of the handwriting 
testimony. Third, Appellees argue that no competent evidence has been offered to 
support the position that Sharon Davis was a "subscribing witness." Fourth, the 
Appellees argue that the trial court found that Sharon Davis was not a "subscribing 
witness." Fifth, the Appellees argue that the statutes do not prohibit the testimony of 
John Ashton, David Carter, and Stuart Wentz. Sixth, Appellees argue that the statues are 
only recording requirements and should not be interpreted as limitations on evidence of 
forgery. Each of these arguments will be addressed individually. 
A. The handwriting testimony constitutes plain error 
Appellees correctly point out that "an objection to evidence not raised at trial will 
not be considered on appeal." Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 839 
(Utah 1984). Appellants do not dispute that trial counsel failed to make a specific and 
timely objection to the admission of the handwriting expert's testimony, nor is it disputed 
that trial counsel failed to object to the handwriting testimony of John Ashton, David 
Carter, or Stuart Wentz. What Appellees fail to acknowledge is that the courts have held 
that a party may obtain appellate relief for an alleged error, despite the lack of a 
contemporaneous objection, if the error amounts to plain error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
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To establish the existence of plain error a party must show that: "(i) an error exists, 
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (iii) that the error was 
harmful." Id The court further explained that the error is harmful if, "[the court's] 
confidence in the verdict is undermined." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that where a "subscribing witness" is available 
handwriting evidence is inadmissible. Cazares v. Cosby, 2003 UT 3, \ 17. Here the trial 
court clearly erred in admitting the handwriting expert's testimony concerning the alleged 
forgery of the Easement Document because Sharon Davis qualified as a "subscribing 
witness" and testified at the trial. The Appellants have addressed whether Sharon Davis 
qualified as a "subscribing witness" in the Appellants' Brief at pages 34-38. The sum of 
Sharon Davis' testimony is that she presumed the signatories to the Easement document 
had personally appeared before her because she followed an established procedure for 
notarizing documents which would have precluded forgery and because there appeared 
no other way that Dwane Sykes could have obtained her signature. In fact, when first 
questioned whether she had ever met, or spoken to Hugh Vem Wentz who purportedly 
signed the Easement Document she responded: "Obviously I did because I signed the 
document. But I don't recall specifically." It is important to point out that Sharon Davis 
signature, which appears on the bottom of the Easement Document was acknowledged to 
be authentic by Appellees' handwriting expert. Although Sharon Davis could not 
remember a specific appearance by the signatories, it was obvious from her testimony 
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that she had no particular memory of most of those persons that had appeared before her 
to execute documents. These facts are sufficient to establish at the least that Sharon 
Davis was a possible "subscribing witness" and the standard set in Cazares clearly 
requires that the trial court make some finding regarding the status of subscribing 
witnesses before admitting handwriting testimony. Cazares, 2003 UT at 3, \ 25. In the 
instant case the trial court made no reference whatsoever to Sharon Davis' status as a 
"subscribing witness." More importantly, the trial court made no reference to Sharon 
Davis' testimony in its Memorandum Decision, Finding of Facts, and Conclusions of 
Law, or Final Judgment. For these reasons this court should find that the trial court 
committed error in admitting the handwriting evidence and should remand on the issue of 
whether Sharon Davis qualified as a "subscribing witness." 
The second prong of the test requires that the error should have been obvious to 
the court. An important case impacting this issue is State v. Braun, 1%1 P.2d 1336 (Utah 
1990). In Braun, the defendant was convicted of sexual abuse of a child. Id. at 1337. 
During the trial the child testified that her father had touched her vagina. Id. In addition 
to the child's testimony the state relied on the testimony of expert witnesses, one of 
whom was a psychologist. Id. The psychologist testified regarding "the substance of her 
interviews with [the child] and commented on [child]fs affect, compared [the child] to 
profiles of typical sexual abuse victims, and expressed her opinion that [the child] was a 
victim of sexual abuse." Id. 
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The Braun court held that the trial court had committed error in allowing the 
psychologist to testify that the child had suffered sexual abuse because she matched the 
"profile of a sexually abused child. Id. at 1340. In reaching this conclusion, the court 
relied on an earlier case that had determined that expert testimony that a child fit the 
profile of "a sexually abuse child" was in admissible. Id. The court, however, 
determined that this error was not obvious to the trial court because "trial court did not 
have the benefit of Rimmasch and its progeny to guide it when faced with the 
admissibility of the expert testimony, nor does the language of rule 702 point to an 
inherent reliability requirement for this type of expert testimony." Id. at 1341. Unlike 
the trial court in Braun, the trial court here had the benefit of Cazares to guide it when 
facing the issue of whether handwriting testimony was admissible when a "subscribing 
witness" was able to testify at trial. Additionally, unlike rule 702, which did not contain 
an inherent reliability requirement, Utah Code Ann. §57-2-14 specifically states that: 
No proof by evidence of the handwriting of a party, or of the subscribing 
witness or witnesses, shall be taken unless the officer taking the same shall 
be satisfied that all the subscribing witnesses to such conveyance are dead, 
out of the jurisdiction, or cannot be had to prove the execution thereof. 
The trial court had not only the benefit of Cazares to guide it in determining that 
the handwriting testimony was inadmissible, the court had the statues themselves, which 
expressly prohibit the introduction of handwriting testimony unless all subscribing 
witnesses cannot be had to prove the execution thereof. For these reasons it should have 
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been obvious to the trial court that it was committing error when it admitted the 
handwriting evidence. 
The third prong of the test is that the error must have caused a harm, or in other 
words, that the harm was significant enough that this court's confidence in the verdict has 
been undermined. In the instant case the trial court referenced the testimony of the 
handwriting expert several times in its Memorandum Decision, Finding of Facts, and 
Conclusions of Law, or Final Judgment. Yet, the trial court never referenced the 
testimony of Sharon Davis, or made any findings regarding her status as a "subscribing 
witness." In Cazares, the court acknowledged that there was a "strong presumption of 
proof given subscribing witnesses' signatures." Id. at f 21. By admitting the 
handwriting evidence and essentially ignoring the testimony and status of Sharon Davis 
the trial court unduly prejudiced the Appellants by overturning the strong presumption of 
proof granted to subscribing witnesses in favor of the less reliable handwriting evidence. 
Appellees' argument that the testimony of the handwriting expert, John Ashton, 
David Carter, and Stuart Wentz are not subject to appellate relief because trial counsel 
failed to make a timely objection fails because the courts have long held that appellate 
relief may be granted if the trial court committed plain error. In the instant case the 
evidence supports a finding of plain error. 
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B. The trial court never made a finding of fact or conclusion of law regarding 
Sharon Davis' status as a "subscribing witness." 
Appellees' second argument focuses on the requirements for an appellant to 
successfully challenge a trial court's finding of fact, or fact-dependent legal conclusions. 
It is true that an appellant who is challenging a trial court's findings of fact or fact-
dependent legal rulings "must first marshal all of the evidence in support of the finding 
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even 
when viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 
UT 82, % 16. Appellees' Brief at page 33 states that Appellants have not marshaled any 
evidence in support of their challenge, and that Appellants' have simply claimed that 
their was no evidence on which the trial court could base its ruling. 
Appellees, however, have mistaken the nature of the Appellants' challenge. 
Appellants are not challenging any of the specific findings of fact or law, rather 
Appellants' challenge is that the trial court erred in admitting handwriting evidence when 
there was a "subscribing witness" who testified in court. Cazares clearly established that 
in order to admit handwriting evidence the court had to first determine whether there are 
"subscribing witnesses." Cazares, 2003 UT at 3, TJ 22. Therefore, the finding of fact or 
legal conclusion that Appellants would challenge is one in which the trial court found that 
Sharon Davis was not a 'subscribing witness." However, nowhere in the Findings of Fact 
or Conclusions of Law does the trial judge reference the status of Sharon Davis as a 
"subscribing witness." Thus the Appellants are not relying on a claim that there is no 
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evidence to support the finding, rather Appellants assert that there is no finding or 
conclusion for them to challenge. 
C. Appellants have provided evidence that Sharon Davis was a "subscribing 
witness." 
In their third argument, Appellees assert that Appellants have not provided any 
evidence that Sharon Davis was a "subscribing witness." Appellees correctly cite 
Cazares when they state that a notary is only a "subscribing witness" if she "personally 
witnessed the execution of the questioned deed." Id. at % 20. It is also true that the "mere 
existence of an acknowledgment on an instrument raises no presumptions that the notary 
was a witness." Id. at f 21. However, Appellees are mistaken when they state 'that the 
primary prerequisite for subscribing witness status is that [Sharon Davis] must 
affirmatively testify that she witnessed the execution of the conveyances." [Appellees' 
Brief page 35.] This is simply not true. Nowhere in Cazares does the court state that the 
prerequisite for subscribing witness status it to affirmatively testify that she witnessed the 
execution of the conveyance. In point of fact, the only prerequisite placed on subscribing 
witnesses is that they personally witness the execution but the court is silent as to how 
that may be proven. Id. 
The Cazared court found that the notary that affirmatively testified that she had 
not been in the grantor's presence at the time of execution was the only notary 
disqualified as a subscribing witness. Id. at ^  23. The court then remanded the case back 
to the trial court to determine if the other notaries were "subscribing witnesses," but it 
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gave no direction on what evidence was necessary to prove an individual was a 
subscribing witness. Consequently, there are several ways that an individual may prove 
that she was present as a subscribing witness to the execution of a document. With that 
in mind, Appellants offered numerous and substantial pieces of evidence to prove that 
Sharon Davis was in the personal presence of the signatories at the time that the 
Easement document and Quit Claim Deed were executed. Sharon Davis made the 
following statements under oath: 
1. That the signature on the bottom of the Easement Document and Quit Claim 
Deed were hers. [R. 1029:12-13]. 
2. That she had no independent recollection of the Easement Document and how 
it was notarized because it had been approximately 26-27 years since the 
Easement Document had purportedly been notarized and because she had 
notarized many documents when she was a notary. 
3. That the only time she would sign a document without the signatory present 
was if she knew the signatory personally and knew their signatures personally. 
[R. 1036:3-5]. 
4. That she had never notarized a document in blank and given it to anyone. [R. 
1004:9-11]. 
5. That she had never given anyone her notary seal. [R. 1004: 12-13]. 
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6. When asked if she had ever met, or spoken with Hugh Vern Wentz , who 
purportedly signed the Eaesment Document, Sharon Davis first answered, 
"obviously I did because I signed the document. But I don't really recall 
specifically." 
These statements are just a sampling of the evidence provide by Appellants in 
support of the proposition that Sharon Davis qualified as a "subscribing witness." 
Appellees argue that Sharon Davis' testimony regarding strict procedure is too 
irregular and volitional to be a habit. Appellees rely on United States v. Rangel-Arreola, 
991 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir. 1993). In that case the court held that habit was defined as a 
"regular practice of meeting a particular kind of situation with a certain type of conduct, 
or a reflex behavior in a specific set of circumstances." Appellees argue that Sharon 
Davis actions to not constitute a habit because she does not require the presence of those 
individuals she knows personally. According to Appellees, this requires Sharon Davis to 
"think about how well she knows someone and to make a determination about how she 
will respond. Thus it does not comply with the definition of habit as given by the court." 
However, Appellees have overlooked the plain meaning of the court. It is true that 
Sharon Davis did not require the signatory to be present if she knew the signatory 
personally. But such actions are not irregular or volitional, rather Sharon Davis is merely 
reflexively responding to a different set of specific circumstances. 
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If Sharon Davis knew the signatory personally then she did not require the 
signatory's presence to notarize a document; if she did not know the signatory then she 
did require their presence along with I.D. This is not irregular behavior. On the contrary, 
Sharon Davis met each situation of specific circumstances in a similar habitual way. The 
fact that the two scenarios present different sets of specific circumstances does not in 
anyway defeat the fact that she responds to those circumstances reflexively. Nor does the 
argument that Sharon Davis must think each time about how well she knows an 
individual, and then determine how to act accordingly. 
D. The trial court never found that Sharon Davis was not a "subscribing 
witness." 
Appellees fourth argument is that the trial court found that Sharon Davis was not a 
"subscribing witness," even though the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusion of 
Law make no reference to Sharon Davis' status as a "subscribing witness." In support of 
this argument Appellees rely on State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41. In Pecht the court held that 
"as a rule, this court generally 'upholds the trial court even if it failed to make findings on 
the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such 
findings.'" Id. ^ 22. The Pecht court continued that it would not follow the general rule 
when "(1) an ambiguity of facts makes the assumption unreasonable, (2) a statute 
explicitly provides that written findings must be made, or (3) a prior case states that 
findings on an issue must be made." Id. 
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The Pecht court makes clear that one clear exception to the general rule is when 
there is an ambiguity of facts. In Cazares, the court remanded the case to the trial court 
in order to determine whether the remaining notaries were actually present because the 
court held that the court had not made any findings regarding whether the remaining 
notaries had acknowledged the documents in the presence of the signatories. Id. at ]f 24. 
The court further stated that there was insufficient evidence in the record to determine 
whether the remaining notaries had been in the presence of the signatories. Id. at ^ j 25. 
Interestingly, the court acknowledged that the record showed that both Weir and 
Eastman, the remaining notaries had testified that they could not recall whether the 
signatories had been in their presence when they had executed the documents. Id. at f 9. 
In the instant case the same circumstances apply in that Sharon Davis testified that she 
could not recall being in the presence of the signatories. If the record evidence was 
insufficient in Cazares, why is the same record evidence suddenly clear when presented 
in the instant case to show that Sharon Davis was not a "subscribing witness?" The truth 
is that in both cases the facts were ambiguous as to whether the signatories had been in 
the presence of the notary when she acknowledged the documents in question. As a 
result, the court is not bound to uphold the trial court. 
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E. Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 and 57-2-14 should bar John Ashton, David 
Carter, and Stuart Wentz from testifying. 
Appellees' fifth argument asserts that the two statutes interpreted in Cazares do 
not preclude the testimony of the John Ashton, David Carter, and Stuart Wentz. 
Appellees are correct when they state that statues are construed in accordance with the 
plain meaning of the language used. State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1228 (Utah 
1997). Yet, Appellees proceed to ignore that very plain language in arguing that the 
testimonies of John Ashton, David Carter, and Stuart Wentz were admissible regarding 
the authenticity of the handwriting on the documents when a "subscribing witness" 
testified at trial. 
It is true that the statutes do not address testimony unrelated to handwriting 
evidence. Thus in Appellees' hypothetical an individual would be able to testify that the 
purported grantor was in the Himalayas at the time of the conveyance but not be able to 
testify as to the whether or not the grantors' signature was authentic. In the instant case, 
if the trial court had confined these individuals' testimonies to things unrelated to the 
forgery of the handwritten signatures , their testimony would indeed have been 
admissible. 
The court, however, allowed Ashton, Carter, and Wentz to testify regarding the 
authenticity of their parents' signatures which is clearly forbidden by Utah Code Ann. 
§§57-2-10 and 57-2-14. Not only did the trial court allow this testimony, but it 
incorporated it into its Findings of Fact. For example, the trial court's Findings of Fact 1{ 
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36(e) uses John Ashton's testimony that his parents' signatures did not appear to be 
genuine as one of his factors upon which the finding of fraud was based. Allowing John 
Ashton, David Carter, and Stuart Wentz to testify concerning the authenticity of their 
parents5 signatures was no different from allowing the handwriting expert to testify as to 
the authenticity of the signatures. In either case it was an attempt to prove by evidence of 
the handwriting of a party that the document was a forgery. This is clearly forbidden by 
the plain meaning of the §§57-2-10 and 57-2-14. 
F. Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-10 and 57-2-14 are properly construed to have an 
evidentiary effect at trial. 
Appellees' final argument is that the court in Cazares was incorrect. On page 41 
of the Appellees' Brief, Appellees argue that the legislature never intended to "affect the 
types of evidence admissible at a trial on the issue whether a document is a forgery." 
This is entirely contrary to the court's assessment of the legislature in Cazares. In that 
case the court stated "this court assumes that the legislature, in repealing the requirement 
that a subscribing witness sign every deed for it to be valid, yet retaining the provision 
now found in Utah Code Ann. 57-2-10 [hierarchy of evidence], was mindful of the 
retained provision and its related subject matter and wished it to be given effect." 
Cazares, 2003 UT at 3, |^ 19. The court's position is further strengthened by the long 
standing principle that legislatures are presumed to know of statutes of related matter and 
have them in mind when enacting new statutes. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 
1318 (Utah 1983). If the legislature had truly intended that the Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-
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10 and 57-2-14 have no effect on the type of evidence admissible at trial they could have 
repealed those sections and rewritten them without the evidentiary language and thereby 
ensured that the statutes had no effect on the admissibility of evidence. The legislature in 
its wisdom chose not to repeal those statutes and it is impossible for Appellees to divine 
the intent of the legislature in so acting. Therefore this court should affirm that Cazares 
was right when it determined that these statutes had an evidentiary application. 
4. Pursuant to Rule 31, Appellants request an expedited hearing. 
Pursuant to Rule 31, Appellants request an expedited hearing in this matter. An 
expedited hearing is apposite in this case due to the time sensitive nature of this matter. 
Specifically, Appellants will forever lose their rights to redeem their property on or about 
August 1, 2005. To prevent this injustice, therefore, Appellants request an expedited 
hearing. 
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
For the reason set forth above, Appellants respectfully request find that the trial 
court committed reversible error. 
DATED this | 1 day of July, 2005 
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